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PSYCHIC UNITY CONSTRAINTS U P O N  SUCCESSFUL 
I N T E R C U L T U R A L  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  
JAMES M. DONOVAN and BRIAN A. RUNDLE 
Miscommunication is accepted as an inevitable feature of intercultural communication. 
The majority of writings implicitly assume that these failures are the consequence of lack 
of competencies on the part of the interactants. Alternatively, at least a small percentage 
of these failures may be the result of the language itself. Psychic unity, the anthropological 
concept of a fundamental biological homogeneity of man's mental life, is the unexamined 
property which makes communication of any sort possible. However, the details of psy- 
chic unity, especially as they pertain to category construction, predict that communication 
must fail under conditions which are both predictable and articulable. 
Intercultural communication, which first found its disciplinary voice within the work of 
anthropologist Edward T. Hall, has been defined as a 'transactional, symbolic process 
involving the attribution of meaning between people from different cultures' (Gudykunst 
and Kim, 1984, p. 14). Central to the study of this process is the realization that cultural 
differences present obstacles beyond those present in every act of interpersonal commu- 
nication. For instance, Gudykunst and Kim (1984, p. 30) suggest that all participants 
bring to the exchange cultural, sociocultural, psychocultural, and environmental back- 
grounds which interact to shape the communication event. Since these backgrounds and 
contexts are inherently individual, the simple fact that they differ necessarily leads to 
communication biases, compelling the conclusion that a universal feature of communica- 
tion events is that they all fail to one degree or another. 'It is impossible,' they tell us, 'for 
any two people to communicate without any misunderstanding' (p. 191). 
Lapses during intercultural communication episodes are thereby routinely expected, a 
statement few would find controversial. The difficulty comes in trying to ascertain first the 
source of those gaps or problems, and second, the possibility of correcting or resolving 
them. A large quantity of research in intercultural communication is what Coupland et  al. 
(1991, p. 13) refer to as 'Level III,' wherein 'miscommunication takes on implications of 
personal inadequacy and therefore, perhaps, blame.' The source of failure here is the 
individual participant, but for whom it is assumed that proper education, sensitivity, and/ 
or experience can bridge these gaps, achieving effective intercultural communication. The 
goal of this type of intercultural communication research is to 'minimize' the misunder- 
standings (Gudykunst and Kim, 1984, p. 191) by maximizing speaker 'competence' (e.g. 
Wiseman and Koester, 1993). This outlook has been uncomplimentarily labeled the 'Pol- 
lyanna perspective' (Coupland et  al., 1991, p. 1). 
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For  his part,  Hall understood that 'culture controls behavior in deep and persisting 
ways, many of which are outside of  awareness and therefore beyond conscious control of  
the individual' 0959/1981, p. 25), and therefore 'all that one ever gets from studying foreign 
culture is a token understanding' (pp. 29-30), 'no person ever learns another 's  language 
perfectly' (Campbell,  1964, p. 317). In other words, cultural differences generating mis- 
communication are very unlikely to ever be completely overcome without 'going native.' 
John Wengle (1988) offers some interesting thoughts on this issue for anthropologists. 
He believes that ' the notorious difficulty' some fieldworkers have in learning the native 
language is partly psychologically based. Clinging to one's own native tongue helps the 
anthropologist  to stabilize his or her sense of  personal identity, which is inevitably threa- 
tened by the experience of  immersion during fieldwork (p. 144). In these terms, 'going 
native' is akin to the ~Secondary identification [which] enables the anthropologist  to nar- 
row, for a time, the vast gap of  cultural experience separating him from his subjects' 
(p. 159). So while the types of  cultural learning which would be necessary to minimize 
miscommunication are possible, it is at best a rare accomplishment which entails at least 
one party to the exchange having experienced the disintegration and reconstruction of his 
or her sense of  self. Not  everyone survives the at tempt in good mental health. And in 
some important  senses the problems of intercultural communicat ion have only been shif- 
ted further back by the anthropologist  having assumed the native perspective. Two cul- 
tures are no longer communicating across a breach; rather, one party has leapt across that 
chasm. True intercultural communicat ion will have to wait until the researcher returns 
home to relate what he or she has learned. 
The implication of this study of culture shock is that Level III  research cannot com- 
pletely or routinely resolve the problems of intercultural communication. Even while 
Hall 's caution and Wengle's analysis refute the likely success of  Level III  analyses, they 
nonetheless accept the Level III  implications that failure to communicate is a practical 
consequence of lack of skill of  some kind on the part  of  one or more of  the interlocutors. 
They pay far less attention to Level I sources of  miscommunication, wherein 'routine 
discourse is intrinsically constrained through (a) limited code and channel capacities; (b) 
the interplay between linguistic meaning and context; and hence (c) the need for cognitive 
heuristics in both encoding and decoding' (Coupland et al., 1991, p. 12). Rather  than the 
lack of  ability or talent which could conceivably be largely compensated for by training or 
exposure, Level I difficulties arise from the innate 'fallibility of  human thought and 
action. '  I f  communicat ion success at Level III  is a question of  practical ability, at Level I 
perfect, and sometimes even adequate communicat ion is ruled out as a theoretical possi- 
bility even for perfectly skilled, fully assimilated interactants. 
We agree that the very nature of  the human mind puts constraints upon communicat ion 
events, even if we would not necessarily characterize that nature as ~fallible.' The goal of  
this article is to propose just why this should be the case. Why can I not, even in theory, 
be assured that the thoughts in my mind can be communicated to you? 
The answer, we argue, is that that which makes communicat ion possible also necessa- 
rily makes communicat ion problematic. The anthropological concept of  the psychic unity 
of  mankind is where we must look. 
Psychic unity of mankind 
The inevitable failure of  communicat ion is built upon the argument that each individual 
possesses a unique set of  distorting conceptual filters through which messages must pass 
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(Child, 1950; Gass  and Varonis,  1991). This relativistic posit ion opens the way for a nigh 
infinite amoun t  o f  variation,  some combina t ions  o f  which would  be expected to differ so 
radically that  they remain mutual ly  unintelligible despite one 's  best efforts. 
However ,  the field also holds that  this distort ion can be overcome,  that  in fact inter- 
cultural communica t ion  is always possible to some significant degree. (Relevant here 
would be Wittgenstein 's  denial o f  the possibility o f  a private language, that  is, ' the possi- 
bility o f  a language that  is necessarily private, one that  only one person [or, by extension, 
group o f  persons] could unders tand '  (Alston, 1993, p. 53); as well as George  Herber t  
Mead ' s  'posi t ion that  " y o u  cannot  say anything that  is absolutely particular; anything 
you  say that  has meaning  at all is universal" ' (Leaf, 1979, p. 202).) This second assump- 
tion can only be entertained in a theoretical environment  in which something operates to 
constrain filters f rom assuming all logically possible variants. Thus  Lenneberg can marvel 
that, 
although language families are so different, one from the other, that we cannot find any historical connection 
between them, every language, without exception, is based on the same universal principles of semantics, 
syntax and phonology. All languages have words for relations, objects, feelings and qualities, and the semantic 
differences between these denotata are minimal from a biological point of view.... Thus,...the basic skills for 
the acquisition of language are as universal as a bipedal gait (Lenneberg, 1967, p. 68). 
Gudykuns t  and Kim (1984, p. 164) recognize that  h u m a n  cultural variat ion is built 
upon  a commona l i ty  o f  some kind, observing that  'Mos t  cross-cultural researchers 
enthusiastically assume a universality o f  a c o m m o n  core o f  h u m a n  culture while 
acknowledging the enormous  variat ion in specifics.' Cultural  variability is thus signifi- 
cantly smaller than would be expected without  the constraining influence o f  some inher- 
ently h u m a n  property.  
Campbel l  (1964) argues that  this assumpt ion  o f  basic similarity is necessary to make 
sense o f  any search for variety. ' In  the end, it is because in great bulk we perceive alike 
(respond alike) that  we can note small differences in perception. The total context o f  
agreement  provides the firm pla t form from which we can note a particular,  localized dis- 
crepancy .... [Were] a culture to perceive in a radically different way, we could not  confirm 
communica t ion  and hence could not  ascertain perceptual differences' (p. 325). 
The percept ion o f  a basic similarity o f  cultures has been par t  o f  the anthropological  
mindset  since the field's inception, even if, as Brown (1991) argues, the intellectual foun- 
dations to explain that  similarity have suffered neglect in recent decades. Still, anthropol-  
ogists 'rely upon  [these similarities] at every turn in order  to do their work '  (p. 154). Early 
giants such as Tylor  observed that  'similar arts, customs, beliefs [and] legends are found in 
several distant regions, a m o n g  peoples not  known to be o f  the same stock '  (1878/1964, 
p. 3), while Frazer  depended upon  the relative uniformity  o f  culture to prop  up his version 
o f  the compara t ive  method  used in his voluminous  The Golden Bough. 
Intercultural  communica t ion ,  at least as represented by Gudykuns t  and Kim's  seminal 
text, parts  c o m p a n y  with an th ropo logy  over to what  this perception o f  cross-cultural 
similarity is to be attr ibuted. Cont inuing with the passage begun above, the authors  con-  
clude that: 
The basic explanation for the universality seems to be in the intrinsic nature of humans as social animals and 
in their capacity to use symbols and to develop a speech community. While the detailed manifestations of such 
human social activities vary from culture to culture, all humans need, and have the capacity, to communicate 
within their social and physical environment in one form or another (Gudykunst and Kim, 1984, p. 164). 
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But man as 'social animal' does nothing to explain intercultural communicability. For 
while it is certainly true that all humans develop speech communities prompted by the 
need to 'communicate within their social...environment,' nothing can be concluded from 
this about the prospects for communicating between these communities. This view lacks 
anything to restrict the range of  variability of real languages so that no two become irre- 
deemably unintelligible. 
Historically, anthropology has offered a different explanation. Bastian, partaking of an 
intellectual tradition which dates back to at least Periclean Athens, argued that, 
The physical unity of the species man has been anthropologically established, and as a consequence we now 
look for the psychic unity of mankind. The psvchic unity of social thought (collective representations) under- 
lies the basic elements of  the body social. The world over we will find a monotonous sub-stratum of identical 
elementary ideas, identical in spite of local variations. These few elementary ideas exist in all natural savage 
conditions and also under the artificial veneer of every civilization; they are indeed those seminal ideas from 
which civilizations have grown (Bastian, quoted by Koepping, 1983, pp. 175-176). 
Both cross-cultural similarities and variations are accounted for in this scheme as being 
the elaboration of  a limited set of  basic social categories. Pertinent to our study here is the 
way the concept of psychic unity is derived from mankind's biological uniformity. 
Any relationship which holds true regardless of  the sociocultural environment must be 
attributed to the only thing which all humans have in common, namely, the biological 
endowments characteristic of  the species. (This does not mean that if a trait varies, it is 
necessarily wholly cultural. Brown (1991, p. 103, n. 6) points out that if 'it varies in a 
regular pattern, it may well not be cultural' due to 'phylogenetic facultative adaptations.'  
But this case is more complicated, and we will therefore be restricting our attention to the 
case of cross-cultural invariants, which are certainly noncultural.) 
Thus, if, as Sapir (1949, p. 153) states, 'a language is so constructed that no matter what 
any speaker of it may desire to communicate, no matter how original or bizarre his idea or 
fancy, the language is prepared to do his work,'  and if, despite the development of a spe- 
cific language in a specific context and the theoretically infinite variety of structure which 
language could adopt, translation in some general sense can occur between any two lan- 
guages, then we are forced to accept two entailments. 
First, that there exist fundamental human universals in language development whose 
operation allow translatability, and second, given the presence of these universals despite 
the cultural variation, that these same universals must be a product of material (physical, 
biological) as opposed to sociocultural causes, which in their turn are responsible for the 
variations upon this common repertoire. 
Thus we arrive at our first conclusion. The working axioms of  the practice of  intercul- 
tural communication can only be justified if they are intuitively built upon the founda- 
tions of  the assumption of  the psychic unity of mankind. That  psychic unity we would 
define as referring to those categories of  mental life which human beings hold in common 
by virtue of  their biological heritage arising from membership within the same species, 
and which are also unique to that species. Within this context, the biological substrate 
which makes human language possible is an important component of psychic unity, and 
the one upon which we will focus. 
The idea that language itself has biologically established parameters which limit its 
variability is not new. Among linguists, Noam Chomsky's (1972) universal grammar and 
Derek Bickerton's (1984) language bioprogram hypothesis are but two articulations of  
this approach. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find evidence of its presence 
PSYCHIC UNITY CONSTRAINTS UPON SUCCESSFUL INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 223 
within the field of  intercultural communication since its very inception. (The details of  
what aspects of  language are innately endowed are still vague, but challengers to 
aspects of  Chomsky's model have arisen; see Bower (1997) for a brief overview of  this 
debate.) 
Edward T. Hall's The Silent Language, published in 1959, is considered the first work in 
the field. Hall, with George L. Trager, attempted to discover the building blocks of  culture 
(referred to by Hall as 'isolates') and a method of  analyzing them to discern their effects 
on communication. In doing so, he concluded that he would have to 'tie these isolates into 
a biological base so they could be compared among cultures' (Hall, 1959/1981, p. 27). 
Furthermore,  Hall writes that, in trying to discover how cultures differ and how these 
differences can be explained, he realized that: 
culture is bio-basic-rooted in biological activities. Infra-cultural is the term which can be given to behavior 
that preceded culture but  later became elaborated by man  into culture as we know it today. [By] going back to 
infraculture it is possible to demonstrate  that  the complex b a s e s - - m a i n l y  b io log ica l - -upon  which human  
behavior have been built were laid down at different times during the history o f  evolution. Trager and I also 
reasoned that the number  o f  infra-cultural bases were probably very few and that they probably led to very 
different types of  activities, things that  on the surface bore little or no apparent  relationship to each other 
(Hall, 1959/1981, p. 37). 
Given such a statement, it is unsurprising to learn that Hall allows for the existence of a 
psychic unity (pers. comm. to Rundle, 1992). 
Our interests, however, do not lie merely with the intellectual archaeology of  disinter- 
ring and revealing the artifact of  psychic unity within the ground of  intercultural com- 
munication. More importantly, having explicitly identified psychic unity, and especially its 
linguistic component,  as the given which generates the expectations of  the field, we wish to 
examine the concept more closely. If psychic unity as thus described makes communica- 
tion possible, further prodding reveals that it also places a ceiling on the expected success 
of  a given communication exchange. 
The goal, therefore, will be to show that a consequence of  founding intercultural com- 
munication upon an assumption of  psychic unity necessarily entails that, even in an ideal 
world, communicability is a variable quantity. While psychic unity guarantees that all 
languages can communicate on most topics, it also renders some things more difficult to 
talk about, and precludes meaningful discussion of  others altogether. As such, psychic 
unity is the biological mechanism effecting the radical subjectivity described by McTear 
and King (1991, p. 198). 
Psychic unity and categorization 
The presence of  the assumption of  psychic unity within the field of  intercultural com- 
munication was detectable because of  the expectation that 'misunderstandings' can be 
'minimized.' The implicit optimism within the discipline that in an ideal world all such 
misunderstandings might be corrected is also a heritage of the history of  psychic unity. 
However, it is not psychic unity as we understand it today, but instead that of  the nine- 
teenth century unilineal evolutionists such as Tylor and Frazer. 
In this archaic model, all human culture is but the unfolding of  an inevitable develop- 
mental process. Such differences as are perceived are, on the one hand, relatively unin- 
teresting when compared to the similarities, and, on the other, can be interpreted as being 
but the lack of  development on the part of  the (other) culture, or due to the incidental 
effect of historical accident and again, relatively uninteresting. 
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This interpretation of  culture encouraged a direct mapping from one culture to another. 
To understand something in one culture, one dissected the phenomenon in an altogether 
different sociocultural setting, and then generalized freely back to the original problem. 
Since the examples were understood to be but two products of a unitary and inevitable 
process, each instance was immediately 'translatable' from one to any other. 
This was the explicit logic used by James Frazer in his massive The Golden Bough: 
if we can show that a barbarous custom, like that of  the priesthood of  Nemi, has existed elsewhere; if we can 
detect the motives which led to its institution; if we can prove that these motives have operated widely, per- 
haps universally, in human  society, producing in varied circumstances a variety of  institutions specifically 
different but generically alike; if we can show, lastly, that these very motives with some of  their derivative 
institutions, were actually at work in classical antiquity; then we may fairly infer that at a remoter age the 
same motives gave birth to the priesthood of  Nemi. (Frazer, 1890/1981, p.3). 
This charmingly naive perspective was explicitly justified by the understanding of  psychic 
unity which Frazer had inherited from Bastian and Tylor: 'For  recent researches into the 
early history of  man have revealed the essential similarity with which, under many super- 
ficial differences, the human mind has elaborated its first crude philosophy of  life' (Frazer, 
1890/1981, p. 3; note how the very sentence invokes the title of  Tylor's book). 
Although Frazer was attempting to understand religion, and our focus here is on lan- 
guage, the logic used in both projects is identical: because the disparate members of a 
c l a s s - - fo r  Frazer, religious observances, for intercultural communication, speech a c t s - -  
are assumed to derive from a single source which we have termed the 'psychic unity of 
mankind,' the default expectation is that all members of the class bear a genetic relation- 
ship which permits a transposition of one to the other. 
Anthropology at the turn of this century rejected the unilinear approach to cultural 
development, and thereby the specific articulation of  psychic unity which supported it. 
Culture traits which appear to be similar are no longer be assumed to be similar in fact. In 
a tour de force which almost single-handedly demolished this line of investigation, Franz 
Boas observed that 
The theory of  parallel development [unilinear evolutionism], if it is to have any significance, would require 
that among  all branches of  mankind  the steps of  invention should have followed, at least approximately, in 
the same order, and that no important  gaps should be found. The facts, so far as known at the present time, 
are entirely contrary to this view (Boas, 1911, p. 182). 
If the supposition that all cultures have evolved along a single continuum is false, then the 
assumption that all traits seen to be similar are homologous must also be false, or at least 
must justify itself on some other principle. 
This change in anthropological paradigm initiated repercussions within American 
anthropology which persist to this day. Historical particularism is now the traditionally 
accepted mode of scholarship, and what explicitly cross-cultural research as is today 
conducted requires that the comparability of the selected culture traits be demonstrated 
rather than assumed (cf. Armer, 1973). 
Obviously, the understanding of psychic unity which warranted unilinear comparative 
research could not have survived this attack. A concept which had originally been 
understood to explain the products of cultural development was now restricted to account 
for the process without reference to the outcome of the application of that process. Using 
a mathematical image, we could say that if a particular culture trait was the sum of an 
algorithm, psychic unity now provided the formula which specified the relevant variables 
and their relationship, while other f a c to r s - - fo r  instance, cultural inheritance, current 
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environment, accident--determined the specific value of  the variables. Brown (1991, p. 
81) discusses the works of  Robin Fox which also argues a distinction between process 
universals and 'substantive' universals; cf. Gudykunst  and Ting-Toomey (1988, p. 138). 
The question then becomes, What kinds of  formulae for language do humans possess by 
virtue of  biological endowment? 
We have already noted that both linguistics generally, as well as intercultural commu- 
nication, allow for a biological substrate to human language. Our attention narrows here 
to the pivotal role of  categories and the role they play in language. Gudykunst  and Kim 
(1984, p. 84) remark that 'The human brain requires categories in order to process infor- 
mation and think. Categorization cannot be avoided; it is necessary for an orderly life.' 
While these authors admit to a universal 'urge' to categorize on the part of  humans, they 
do not explicitly address whence the categories come, and whether all categories are con- 
structed of the same ' s tuf f '  or by the same rules. 
Psychic unity suggests that, not only do humans categorize, but also that the process of 
category formation is not completely arbitrary. Contemporary research into the problem 
substantiates this position. Within a language, categories can be viewed as being con- 
structed around one of  two criteria: perceptual salience, where the phenomena being 
categorized impinge upon the human consciousness by virtue of the species' biological 
equipment, and experiential salience, where categories are constructed out of the envi- 
ronment according to the needs and interests of the speakers. 
Categorization in early models entailed superimposing conceptual 'breaks' upon an 
allegedly continuous array of  environmental stimuli. Perceptual salience holds that some 
of  these stimuli which are logically or even physically continuous are less so when they 
interact with the sensory interfaces of  the human animal. Best studied of  this type is color. 
The original report in 1969 by Berlin and Kay (1991, p. 109) concluded that 'Our essen- 
tially linguistic investigations have led, seemingly inescapably, to the conclusion that the 
eleven basic color categories are pan-human perceptual universals.' Not physical, as in 
optical universals; but rather perceptual universals. A regular cottage industry arose around 
this seminal study, as workers tried either to attack or refine it, such as the contribution by 
MacLaury (1992). Barnes (1987, p. 126) concludes that 'Berlin and Kay's  hypothesis has 
not withstood the challenge of scholarly criticism as well as writers sometimes suggest,' at 
least as pertains to its cultural implications. But the original authors, in a new preface for 
the paperback edition of  their study, offer this summary of  the current state of knowledge: 
While the accumulation of new data has brought substantial changes to our view of the details of the devel- 
opmental sequence as originally represented in this text, the two principal findings of the original study...have 
stood the test of these new data: (1) there are substantive universal constraints on the shape of basic color 
lexicons-- systems of color naming do not vary randomly or capriciously across languages but are constrained 
to a small number of possible types; and (2) basic color lexicons change type over time by adding basic color 
terms in a highly constrained, though not mechanically predictable, manner (Berlin and Kay, 1991, p. v). 
This model, however, accounts for relatively few of  the categories possessed by people. 
Other types of  categories will therefore be built upon different inputs, although the results 
will be structured identically. 
For those categories which probably have a physiological basis such as colours, forms, and facial expressions 
of basic human emotions, prototypes appear to be stimuli which are salient prior to formation of the category, 
whose salience, at the outset, determines the categorical structure of those domains. For categories of concrete 
objects, however, prototypes would appear to develop through the same principles, such as maximization of 
cue validity, as those governing the formation of the categories themselves (Rosch, 1977, p. 35). 
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Two concepts are introduced here. The first, cue validity, is defined by Rosch as 
a probabilistic concept; the validity of  a given cue x as a predictor o f  a given category y (the conditional prob- 
ability o f  y/x) increases as the frequency with which cue x is associated with category y increases and decreases 
as the frequency with which cue x is associated with categories other than y increases (Rosch, 1977, p. 29). 
The second, the basic level, is 
the level o f  abstraction at which the organism can obtain the most  information with the least cognitive effort. 
That  is, to categorize a st imulus means  to consider it, for purposes of  that categorization, not only equivalent 
to other stimuli in the same category but  also different from stimuli not  in that category .... [In] so far as 
categorization occurs to reduce the infinite differences between stimuli to behaviourally and cognitively usable 
proportions,  it is to the organism's  advantage not  to differentiate stimuli from other stimuli when that  differ- 
entiation is irrelevant for the purposes at hand. The basic level o f  classification, the primary level at which cuts 
are made in the environment,. . . is the most  general and inclusive level at which categories can delineate real- 
world correlational structures (Rosch, 1977, p. 29). 
These two concepts, basic level and cue validity, are interrelated. 
In the domain of  both man-made  and biological objects, there occur information-rich bundles of  perceptual 
and functional attributes that form natural  discontinuities. If basic objects (e.g. chair, car) are the most  
inclusive level of  categorization at which there can be many  attributes common  to all or more members of  the 
category, basic objects will, thereby, be categories at the level o f  abstraction for which cue validities are 
maximized (Rosch, 1977, p. 29). 
'The point, '  as Lakoff (1987, p. 50) says, is that 'the level of  categorization is not inde- 
pendent of  who is doing the categorizing and on what basis. Though the same principles 
may determine the basic level, the circumstances under which those principles are 
employed determine what system of categories result.' 
As one example of  this variation grounded in similarity, we can consider category 
width. 'Category width refers to the tendency to classify somewhat discrepant objects in 
the same or different categories' (Gudykunst  and Ting-Toomey, 1988, p. 162). Objects 
which fit into a wide category in one culture may be divided between several narrow 
categories in another. So while category construction is a universal process, both design 
and content of those categories is variable. That  fact complicates attempts to map con- 
cepts from one language system onto the next. 
We are finally equipped to offer a few generalizations relevant to the present investiga- 
tion. Psychic unity provides the invariant algorithm by which humans construct concep- 
tual categories. Incorporating Rosch's terms into our analogy, a generic algorithm directs 
humans to create categories by maximizing cue validity relative to a prototype, and by 
seeking to establish that prototype as the optimal point between the conflicting goals to 
maximize the amount  of  distinctiveness it recognizes in its environment while minimizing 
the recognized features of  that environment which are irrelevant to the organism's needs. 
The result of  the application of  this algorithm is the creation of  a basic level category, 
which is then marked linguistically by a category name such as a common noun. 
The values attached to the algorithm variables can also be largely predetermined if they 
pertain to the small class of perceptually salient stimuli. However, most values are deter- 
mined by the particular needs and interests of the language community. These experien- 
tially salient categories will be more variable cross-culturally, with a higher tendency 
toward idiosyncratic reference which will not be readily comprehensible to non-culture 
mates save to the extent that historically their needs and interests have been of  the same 
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sort, and ideally of the same sort in an identical environment (cf. Hunt, 1989). 'The theory 
of categorization,' Lakoff (1987, p. 96) concludes, 'makes predictions about what human 
category systems can and cannot be like. It does not predict exactly what will be in a given 
category in a given culture or language.' 
Four strategies for cross-linguistic transpositioning of verbal categories 
Equipped with a minimally detailed analysis of psychic unity as it relates to categori- 
zation, we possess the tool needed to place the acknowledged necessary miscommunica- 
tion in a more explicit theoretical context. We can now, in other words, anticipate when 
attempted communication should be successful, or should fail through speaker incompe- 
tence, and alternatively, when that communication begins to fail regardless of the level of 
ability possessed by the participants. 
Invoking again the image of the cultural map, intercultural communication minimally 
requires the transpositioning of conceptual categories as they are marked linguistically 
from one symbol system to another. Reading any collection of articles in this field 
demonstrates that this transpositioning is not the sole requirement for a successful com- 
munication event (e.g. Sajavaara, 1988). But it is hard to imagine very many nontrivial 
events which succeed while failing at this level. As we saw, while categories share the same 
structure, the content varies with the needs and interests of the language communities. 
Because these needs and interests vary, so too will categories, and hence, so too will the 
work needed to successfully effect a transposition so as to accurately convey the concept 
embodied by the original category in terms of the second category system. 
The depiction of psychic unity allows us to predict where communication difficulties are 
likely to arise. Specifically, communication will be easiest to the degree that similar needs 
have worked to create similar conceptual categories. This principle is contained within the 
idea of intersubjectivity. As Giles and Coupland observed: 
interactants share an array of  assumptions; in fact, while it is perennially difficult to capture what is actually shared, 
this must be the case otherwise meaningful communication could never get off the ground....The more shared 
assumptions we have between us, the greater 'intersubjectivity' there will be (Giles and Coupland, 1991, p.2). 
Rather than assuming that all messages are equally communicable, or that difficulties are 
unpredictable, psychic unity holds that there is a continuum of intersubjectivity, and hence 
of communicability. This continuum parallels the degree of overlap between category con- 
tents, which is itself a function of the overlap between the needs and interests of the speech 
communities. 
At one pole are those needs which arise from the fact of biological and physical existence, 
motivating the creation of similar categories in all communities, and hence relatively easily 
to transpose (Campbell, 1964, p. 322); at the other pole will be categories which are purely 
idiosyncratic to a single community making distinctions which will defy all attempts at 
communication short of total immersion and 'going native.' One approaches this latter 
category with accounts such as those told of Eskimos and their many words for snow (this 
popular anthropological example is reviewed by Martin, 1986), or similarly, Plotkin's 
(1993, p. 63) discovery that the Maroons have 23 words for different river rapids. Yiddish, 
we are told, 'has words to describe subtle gradations of the concept "simpleton" that would 
require entire essays in any other tongue' (Browning, 1996). Communicating these differ- 
ences may well be impossible if the second party has never seen snow, experienced white- 
water, or regards cleverness as a present/absent quality. 
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The major points along this continuum are characterized by the types of performative 
strategies required to effect the transpositioning. The four we highlight are (1) translation, 
(2) paraphrase or interpretation, (3) explanation, and (4) evocation. By looking at these 
four strategies, a model can be developed which would predict in advance what can be 
easily and effectively communicated through direct translation, what can, with a moderate 
degree of difficulty be paraphrased and/or explained, what can be understood only with 
great difficulty by using language to evoke meanings which are nowise present in the 
explicit message itself, and, finally, what may remain impossible to accurately and effec- 
tively communicate interculturally. 
Translation 
'Translation' has been variously construed, including as the more generic change from 
one language system to another which we have opted to term 'transposition.' Our use of the 
term is restricted to the sense that it is 'a process where an expression in one language is 
found which is the equivalent of  some expression in another language' (Harris, 1990, p. 118). 
Successful translatability is determined by the degree to which labeled categories over- 
lap between language systems. The further one moves away from empirical basic level 
categories (cat, sun) into abstract domains such as emotions, the less overlap will occur 
and the less translation becomes possible. Translation 'equivalence is a goal to be sought 
but never really achieved [since the] semantic spheres of  translation-equivalent terms 
overlap to varying degrees but probably never coincide in perfection' (Osgood et al., 1975, 
p. 17). Prime candidates for successful translation are the 'semantic primitives' which 'are 
believed to have lexical exponents in all or most of  the world's languages' (Goddard, 1996, 
p. 427). Goddard lists 'someone,' 'something,' 'people,' 'think,' 'know,' 'say,' 'feel,' 
'good,' "bad,' 'do,' and 'happen' as examples of  such primitives. 
An excellent discussion of  this problem is given by Menachem Dagut (1981). First he 
operationalizes the term 'equivalence' as "the Saussurean sense of equal linguistic "value," 
i.e. as the relationship existing between an item in SL (Source Language) and one in TL 
(Target Language), when the TL item performs as nearly as possible the same semantic 
function in TL as the SL item in SL' (p. 61). He next evokes a powerful image which 
illustrates the problem of translation: 
if the vocabulary of  a language is figuratively thought  of  as a kind of shared "map' of  its speakers' experience, 
with the individual designators marking the salient features of  that  experience as selected by the collective 
consciousness of  the language communi ty  [as our model of  psychic unity stipulates], then it is only to be 
expected that every lexical 'map '  will be full of  blank spaces... .And it is also to be expected that, in most  cases, 
the black spaces on the lexical "map' of  one language will not  coincide with those on the lexical 'map" of  
another (Dagut,  1981, p. 63). 
Translation can only occur when points of separate speech communities' lexical maps 
overlap on both the dimensions of  referential denotation as well as affective connotation. 
This overlap can only occur when the needs which motivate categories have been suffi- 
ciently universal to apply to both communities. ' If  the result of a "literal translation" is 
that readers misunderstand what happened, it is a mistranslation, no matter how "accu- 
rately" one might claim the words correspond to the original' (Boswell, 1994, p. 19). 
Experiencing translation failure, the communicator must resort to another strategy. 
Translation failure can often be attributed to the effects of compression. Zipf 's  'Law of  
Abbreviation' (1935/1965) states that the more relevant and used an idea or concept is in a 
culture, the shorter and more specific it will become in terms of language. Conversely, the 
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less an idea or concept is used in a culture, the more cumbersome it will be to describe 
in that culture's language. Translation fails when a condensed concept in SL has no 
overlapping condensed equivalent in TL. 
It is always interesting to come across claims of  nontranslatability, a few of  which are 
collected here: Hall (1959/1981, p. 13) recounts complaints that Sioux has no word for 
time, or the concepts late and waiting; Gudykunst  and Kim (1984, p. 51) claim that Eng- 
lish has no translation for the Greek philotimos; Brazilian Portuguese has no equivalent 
for the phrase, 'Why won't  you open the window?' (Koike, 1992, p. 69); according to 
Giles and Coupland (1991, p. 117), Chinese lacks common counseling words such as 
concern, as in 'I am concerned about you;' 'marriage' as we know it today 'quite corre- 
sponds' to nothing in the ancient world (Boswell, 1994, p. 38); 'Hebrew has no general 
term for 'child', sex automatically being indicated' (Osgood et al., 1975, p. 17); these same 
authors report that in Thai 'there is no word for "brother" ,  only "older brother" or 
"younger b ro the r" '  (p. 30); 'the concepts "wog" and "nigger" cannot be translated into 
Latin or Greek (Thompson, 1989, p. 4). 
'Among some Indian peoples of South America, same-gender sex to orgasm is so com- 
mon that their native languages do not have words for the activity' (Quinn, 1996, pp. 37- 
38); 'Polish does not have a word corresponding exactly to the English word disgust', 
while 'Australian Aboriginal language Gidjingali does not seem to distinguish lexically 
"fear"  from " shame" '  (Wierzbicka, 1986, p. 584); similarly, Brazilian Portuguese cannot 
directly translate the concept of 'dread' (Donovan, 1993, 1994, p. 638). Every reader can 
probably expand this list with examples from their own experience. 
Paraphrase 
Transpositionings can utilize paraphrases to fill those voids which exist at the level of 
the word, allowing more of  the categories in SL to be rendered in TL. This strategy capi- 
talizes on the fact that while overlap is not sufficient to allow translation, it is adequate to 
permit rough communication, although at a loss. The particular context will determine 
whether what is lost is relevant to the message. For instance, while philotimos cannot be 
translated, we are told that it suggests 'a person who follows the norms of  the culture' 
(Gudykunst  and Kim, 1984, p. 51). 
Paraphrastic interpretation occurs when one takes the original message and transposes it 
into another system's approximate (as opposed to exact) language equivalents. Although 
the denotative meaning of  the original language can often be preserved, rarely can all of  the 
connotative meaning(s) of  the original language also be conveyed. In keeping with our 
map analogy, paraphrasing would be necessary when SL and TL overlap, but when one 
conceptual node is larger than the other. If it is the SL node that is larger, then para- 
phrastic transpositioning must serve to constrict the scope within the TL. This would be the 
case when one word in SL could be any of  several words in TL, as Burling (1984, p. 73) 
illustrates with the example of the English hand. If, on the other hand, it is the TL node 
which is larger, then paraphrasing will be required to expand it in the TL, perhaps by 
concatenating several proximate SL categories. 
An example of  the type of  conceptual categories which might be paraphrased during 
transpositioning involves kinship. Because reproduction is biologically based, this fact 
serves as a small seed for a category submitted to a tremendous amount  of cultural 
articulation. Terms for the biological nuclear family (mother, brother, father, sister) are 
translated easily, and in fact serve as primitives for the study of  genealogies within 
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anthropology. But some systems (e.g. the Hawaiian) use the same term to denote mother 
and mother 's sister. If we use our 'aunt'  to gloss Hawaiian mother 's sister, we preserve the 
denotative reference, but we lose the social meaning backing up the indigenous term since 
the obligations expected of our aunts differ from what are expected from Hawaiian 
mother 's  sisters. 
A recent formalization of  paraphrase for purposes of  scholarly standardization is Nat- 
ural Semantic Metalanguage. In this method, idiosyncratic emotion terms are deconstruc- 
ted into a set of  sentences composed entirely of  universal semantic primitives (Wierzbicka, 
1986; Goddard,  1996). For  instance, English anger is rendered as 'when X thinks of  Y, X 
thinks something like this: "this person did something bad; I don' t  want this; I would want 
to do something bad to this person"; because of  this, X feels something bad' (Goddard, 
1996, p. 427). The intent is that eventually sets of  such paraphrastic structures can be 
compared cross-culturally, permitting precise identification on what variables a term like 
anger might differ from its seemingly identical counterpart  in another culture. 
Explanation 
We may choose to couple a paraphrase such as 'aunt' with our third strategy, an 
explanation or definition to explain what has been lost. This strategy is commonly resor- 
ted to in either of  two circumstances. Most generally, the source concept is artificially 
overgeneralized so that it abuts one or more concepts within the target language. This 
connection made, some words are used to whittle the category back down. Operationally, 
the author will preserve the original source vocabulary within the text, there being no way 
to translate it or accurately paraphrase it. The second use of  explanation is as a net to 
catch the meanings which fell out of  the original concept when it was paraphrased into the 
target. Hence, while we might render the Hawaiian's mother 's sister as 'aunt, '  an author 
who wished to be accurate would include a footnote explaining the differences. 
An example of  explanation can be seen in the French phrase l'esprit d'escalier. In Eng- 
lish this phrase's transliteration would be 'spirit of  the stairs.' Obviously, this phrase 
means nothing to an English speaker beyond its literal content. A paraphrase into English 
would roughly correspond to the word 'afterthought, '  but this rendering would also be 
incorrect, failing as it does to preserve the essence of  the French expression. One must 
therefore explain the meaning: the reminiscing thoughts one has while walking down the 
stairs after some sort of  communication engagement involving other people (e.g. a party, 
a business meeting, etc.). 
Evocation 
Finally, there is evocation, the most difficult of all the strategies. Evocation is used to 
summon/produce/inspire a meaning that is not itself present in the message, and partakes 
of  Wittgenstein's distinction 'between what can be said and what can only be shown' 
(Dilman, 1983, p. 76). One finds it necessary to use evocation especially when the topic of  
the intended communication is neither a physical nor a social reality, but an emotional or 
a state-of-consciousness-linked reality. 
Evocation can be used to deal with categories which are abstracted from real phenomena. 
Hence, beauty and emotions would be typical topics whose cross-cultural understanding 
would require evocation. Consider a statement like, 'That girl is beautiful.' Odds are good 
that counterparts to each of  the parts of  this phrase can be found in any language. The 
question, though, is what is tied up within the concept of  'beautiful.' While all societies 
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have standards of  beauty, most societies have somewhat different standards of beauty. 
Hence, beauty is something easier to attribute than to discuss: 'Beauty is something we 
praise, something we like to contemplate, and we find that it is always more than what we 
can say about it. Hence we often speak of  beauty as 'myster ious" '  (Dilman, 1983, p. 72). 
While Rosch reports that some emotions are probably universal, and Izard (1980) 
numbers these as eight based upon cross-cultural recognition of  facial expressions, Wierz- 
bicka (1986, p. 587) is more conservative, concluding that we 'simply do not know' if there 
are any 'emotion concepts that have been lexically recognized as distinct and identifiable in 
all languages of the world.' It seems doubtful, then, that all emotions exist in all cultures. 
Repeatedly, anthropologists are admonished about the need to learn 'new emotions' while 
in the field (cf. Boas, 1911, p. 98). Dilman (1983) likewise suggests that while there is a 
common human emotional quality (p. 154), the child must learn these as part of devel- 
opment (p. 111), implying that variations in learning and cultural emphasis will result in 
variations in emotional responses available to that individual and all similarly placed 
persons. Emotions do not just 'happen' (as perhaps 'feelings' might, to those who wish to 
split this particular hair), but rather, culture determines what one 'can want, feel and do' 
(p. 142). Just as there are culture-bound syndromes (Simons and Hughes, 1985), it is very 
likely that there are culturally unique emotional experiences as well. 
Robert Levy's (1973) report on the Tahitians highlights this communication difficulty 
through his discussion of  the problems, seemingly insurmountable, which his informants 
had with the concept of  'sadness.' 
There are aspects o f  Tahitian vocabulary which represent perhaps both an expression of  a situation and a con- 
trol over its occurrence, in the present case a lack o f  a specific vocabulary for the expression of  mild or moderate 
longing emotions. There are words for severe grief and for lamentations. There are, however, no unambiguous 
terms which represent the concepts of  sadness, longing, or loneliness in the sense of  'depressed or sad because of  
the lack of  friends, companionship, and so on. '  People would name their condition, where I supposed that the 
context called for 'sadness'  or 'depression,' as 'feeling troubled' (pe'ape'a, the generic term for disturbances, 
either internal or external); as 'not feeling a sense of inner push' (ana'anatae, inner push or enthusiasm); as 
'feeling heavy' (t'/aha); as 'feeling fatigued' (haumanO; and a variety of other terms all referring to a generally 
troubled or subdued bodily state. These are all nonspecific terms, which had no implication of any external 
relational cause about them, in the sense that 'angry' implies an offense or a frustration (Levy, 1973, p. 305). 
From this exposition, we may conclude that 'sadness,' as we use and understand the 
term, has no exact counterpart  in the Tahitian language, precluding translation. Para- 
phrase might be suitable for some communicatory purposes, provided the message 
depends more upon a generic 'suboptimal and low energy' without requiring any details. 
For  instance, a general understanding that you are 'just out of  sorts' would do if I am 
seeking to understand why you were not paying attention to what I said, but not if I am 
seeking to understand your problem so that I can suggest possible solutions. Explanation 
perhaps suits academic discussions, with its vaunted objectivity, but fails to communicate 
what the person is really experiencing, which is the goal of  most social discourse. Clinical 
literature is replete with the difficulties encountered by patients trying to communicate 
their emotional states, who usually depend heavily upon analogy with more common 
states, which are then intensified and conjuncted with others to create the unique mix 
which is being experienced by the speaker. 
/ f t h e  concept has a basis in reality, then at the least the object can be pointed to: that 
painting, there, is beautiful to me, although I cannot tell you why. Through such pointing, 
I can understand where you find beauty, even though I may not understand why you 
think that exemplar belongs in this particular catego~ry. If, however, the concept has basis 
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in reality, being purely abstract, or based upon subjective states, then pointing will not 
suffice, and I will fail to understand what you mean. 
Returning to the Tahitians, we found that they lacked a category corresponding to our 
'sadness.' This in itself is unremarkable; what holds our interest, however, is the apparent 
difficulty Tahitians encountered when trying to learn the idea: 
Fairly competent French-Tahitian bilingual speakers...did not understand the meaning of triste in its sense of 
'sorrowful, mournful, melancholy, dejected" and defined its use as hamaui, 'fatigued," or mar, ~gentle.' 
The lack of specific vocabulary does not mean that these states are inexpressible. It would be perfectly possible 
for a man to say something like 'I felt bad because my vahine had gone on a trip, and there was no one else in 
the house, and my thoughts kept turning to her.' The common way, in fact, to express that one misses an 
absent person is to say that one ~thinks' about him or 'thinks repeatedly" about him. It seems hard to say more 
than that (Levy, 1973, p. 306). 
Evocation reaches a sublime form when our attention turns to religious language. Much 
has been written about the nature and goal of  religious discourse. Our comments here are 
restricted to some few observations. 
What does it mean to try to communicate that 'God is good'? To claim this to claim 
knowledge of God,  which necessarily entails a mystical experience of theophany. Plato 
himself has held such experiences to be incommunicable (Roszak, 1980, p. 309), and 
Maslow (1976, p. 24) held that ritualized religions are but feeble attempts to communicate 
or recreate the 'original mystical experience of the original prophets. '  
If it is difficult for the informant to encode the necessary information to be conveyed for 
communication to the anthropologist, worse still are the assertions that successful decod- 
ing can be done only by those 'who already know what you mean' (Maslow, 1976, p. 84; 
Fromm, 1950, p. 90, expresses a similar belief). Most damaging to the project of inter- 
cultural communication, however, is the fact that sometimes the goal of  religious dis- 
course is 'aimed at inspiration, not information' (Barrett, 1988, p. 79), where to 
'understand a religious expression supposes that a passion will...follow the learning' 
(Holmer, 1961, p. 47). The religious pluralism evident today demonstrates utterly the 
failure to achieve such universal conversion, and thus, by at least this standard, for the 
religious communication to achieve its intended goal. 
Conclusions 
This article began with the unchallenged assertion that intercultural communication 
episodes are necessarily imperfect. The disciplinary corpus reflects the correct assumption 
that much of this failure is attributable to the lack of various competencies on the part of 
the communicants. Experts become vague, however, where the line should be drawn, if at 
all, beyond which increased competency will not yield improved communication. 
The principle of  psychic unity assures us that there will be some experiences (not many, 
but some) which are so far removed from the ordinary processes of categorization and 
conceptualization that the raw data cannot be encapsulated faithfully into language sys- 
tems constructed for the communication of mundane realities. If so, limits arise as to what 
messages can be successfully 'encoded' in the first place. On the other hand, if an experi- 
ence becomes common enough to generate a shared linguistic vocabulary in one language 
community, odds are that these terms and concepts can be communicated only very 
crudely to participants of other cultures which have not routinized that specific experience 
or concept, limiting what can be 'decoded.' 
PSYCHIC UNITY CONSTRAINTS UPON SUCCESSFUL INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 233 
The very qual i ty  which makes any c o m m u n i c a t i o n  at all possible, psychic unity,  guar-  
antees that  successful c o m m u n i c a t i o n  will vary on a c o n t i n u u m  from the universally 
unders tandab le  to the solipsistically incommunicab le .  This range will appear  even in an 
ideal world of  perfectly competen t  communica tors .  This  conclus ion arises because while 
the biological founda t ions  of  psychic uni ty  cons t ra in  cognitive category fo rmat ion  so that  
no language system is utterly alien when compared  to any other, the needs and  interests of  
par t icular  cul tural  emphases,  which provide the universal  process of  category format ion  
with the raw mater ial  of  conten t  for crystal l izat ion leading to lexical glossing, are neces- 
sarily variable.  Divergence within limits is the result, with that  divergence occurr ing in 
predictable contexts. At  least some miscommunica t i on  is buil t  into the essence of  com- 
munica t ion ,  and  canno t  be characterized as per formance  failure. 
M a n y  readers will have long ago accepted this necessary theoretical limit to communi -  
cat ion success. W h a t  we have offered these scholars is an  ar t iculated founda t ion  for this 
premise. 
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